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Brief Response to Attorney Albright's Article

Brief Response to Professor Bayer's Article

By Prof. Peter Brandon Bayer

By D. Chris Albright

Attorney D. Chris Albright's provocative plea that the phrase
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is insufficiently religious to

The inapplicability of the Supreme Court's school prayer decisions
to the Pledge is implicitly conceded by Professor Bayer's argument that
the Pledge should be treated as containing "a prayer of adoration
sandwiched among ... secular affirmations." The Pledge is not in fact a
prayer, as it is merely declaratory, and is neither addressed to nor
intended as a communication with Deity. Only by insisting that the
Pledge be defined as prayer can the reasoning of the Supreme Court's
school prayer cases be twisted into application against it.
Professor Bayer maintains that our nation's patriotic documents and
anthems can still be discussed in public schools, notwithstanding the
Pledge decision, since they are only a reflection of their various authors'
personal beliefs. Such potential prior restraint on the public value and
treatment of such documents is, however, precisely what is troubling.
One may be directed to study the love letters of Lincoln for purely
historic reasons, to learn more about the man's biography, without
expectation of developing similar feelings towards the object of his
affection. However, the Gettysburg Address was never intended as a
merely private profession of Lincoln's own personal politics, with no
more value to stir the public soul than the dissected anatomy of a frog.
Rather, the Gettysburg Address, like the Declaration of Independence
and other similar documents and anthems, has been treated for
generations as intended not just for public study, but for public
celebration, as articulating our nation's purpose and the basis for the
rights which its citizens cherish. Nature abhors a vacuum. If our patriotic
creeds may now only be discussed with detachment and dispassion, as if
they were solely and only of historic or biographical worth, but their
rhetoric and values may not be publicly celebrated, let alone inculcated,
one wonders what philosophies will be utilized to fill the void. What will
future generations be told is the purpose of our nation, or the basis on
which they should profess any loyalty thereto, if our great patriotic creeds
are no longer allowed to provide any answers to these questions?
Professor Bayer indicates that the Ninth Circuit's opinion is
consistent with a "reevaluation of core precepts" that our Nation is
currently undergoing. For those who believe our nation's "core precepts"
have served us well, and stand in greater need of continuing promotion
than reevaluation, these are potentially troubling words. This is
especially so if the purported need for such reevaluation is not to be
democratically tested. If the modern era requires a Constitution that
more relentlessly prohibits public expressions of faith than the original,
a democratic process of Constitutional amendment exists to accomplish
this goal. If public recitation of the Pledge violates sound public policy,
Congress and the School Boards may be convinced to abrogate the
legislation that led to this practice. However, if these changes cannot be
accomplished through such democratic methods, but only imposed
against the will of the people, via a judicial coup d'etat, which rewrites
the actual language and intent of the original Constitution, then perhaps
such a reevaluation is not truly in order in the first place. As Justice
Frankfurter once said: "As a member of this Court I am not justified in
writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter
how deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their
disregard."' r_

offend contemporary Establishment Clause principles rests on three
wobbly premises: (1) a limited perspective of some of the Framers, one
which the Supreme Court rightly has eschewed; (2) Supreme Court dicta
reflecting at best certain justices' cursory suppositions about the
religiosity of the words "under God;" and, (3) the wholly irrelevant, and
possibly inaccurate argument that the words "under God" have had scant
influence on schoolchildren. Space constraints mandate that responses to
Mr. Albright's contentions be extremely brief.
Beginning with the intent of the Framers, any "accommodation" of
religious beliefs afforded under the Establishment Clause must not
confound the overarching principle of neutrality. Accommodation
outside a realm of neutrality results in unlawful official endorsement of or
coercion regarding religion. Thus, as noted in my article, a public high
school may not refuse student religious organizations the same access that
secular student groups enjoy because such accommodation evinces
neither favoritism for nor enmity towards religion.' By stark contrast, the
Pledge's inclusion of "under God" renders it an officially sanctioned vow
of national fealty, authored by Congress as testimony that devotion to
and dependence upon divinity are integral precepts of national identity
and purpose. As such, the Pledge does not merely accommodate religion.
Rather, it intentionally fosters religion by engraving Government's
endorsement that to truly adhere to American ideas, one must believe
that our's is a "nation under God."
Consistent with the foregoing, despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's
lament, the Court has long and fittingly rejected the premise that
government may affirmatively promote religion as preferable to atheism,
agnosticism, and unconventional beliefs. 2 Our ever maturing
appreciation of Establishment Clause philosophy has heightened our
awareness of the myriad ways Government, even with good intentions,
may intrude into religious decisions which rightfully and exclusively
belong to, "the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the
individual heart [.]"3 Consequently, based on our unfolding and
increasing cognizance, we may reject discrete practices that the Founders
themselves might have been unwilling or unable to recognize as
4
inconsistent with the core purposes of the very Clause they drafted.
Equally fragile is Attorney Albright's appeal to a line of Supreme
Court dicta that supposes the purposes and effects of reciting the Pledge
with the words "under God" are sufficiently secular to withstand
Establishment Clause review. Of course, unlike the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court has yet to confront squarely the Pledge issue based on a
full evidentiary record and thoroughgoing argument. Similarly, Attorney
Albright declines to confront the text, texture, and thrust of the 1954
amendment. Like the dicta he cites, Mr. Albright uncritically accepts the
term "under God" as dispassionate description -a mere "acknowledgment
of religion" 5 -- and ignores both the clear instrumental nature of the
Pledge and the inevitable goal of religious fostering that results from, and
indeed motivated the addition of those words. By contrast, discussing a
document that expresses a particular author's religious reverence does not
require either embracing or pretending to embrace that author's sectarian
preferences. One readily understands, therefore, Justice Brennan's
hesitancy in dictum upon which Mr. Albright relies that "reference to
divinity in the revised pledge ...
may be no more of a religious exercise
than the reading aloud of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address." 6 Discussing the
philosophy of the Pledge likely is not a religious act, but officially
encouraged recitation of the Pledge's words "under God" is.
The last leg of Mr. Albright's argument is based on the supposition
that because our nation enjoys a wide array of beliefs and practices

ENDNOTES
1. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645
(1943)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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High School Mock Trial Competition Results
by Marcia Stribling, Law Related Education Coordinator
More than 75 attorneys and justices assisted us this year at
the local and state levels of the Nevada High School Mock Trial
Competitions; many volunteered to judge the competitions.
Several more helped by coaching the teams on their strategies
and presentations. Well-established attorneys, those new to the
legal profession and state and local judges served as presiding
judges and scoring judge panel members. Students were judged on
their presentation of information and teamwork rather than on
their knowledge of the law.
Eight teams of students from across Nevada vied for the state
championship in Henderson this past March. High school
students representing Green Valley H.S., Reno H.S., Faith
Lutheran H.S., Advanced Technologies Academy Team A,
Foothill H.S., Advanced Technologies Academy Team C, Galena
H.S., and The Meadows took on the roles of attorneys and
witnesses to present a fictitious criminal case.
Students had practiced and rehearsed their roles since
September under the guidance of a teacher and volunteer
attorney coach. The results of the state competition were: 1st
Place, Reno H.S., and, 2nd Place, Green Valley H.S. Reno H.S.
is now preparing for the national competition which will be held
in New Orleans May 8-10.

The national problem is a civil case, so the students are
developing new strategies and learning new roles. Each round or
case lasts 90 to 120 minutes and includes opening and closing
arguments, presentation and cross examination of witnesses.
If you would like to know more about the mock trial program
or how to help, contact Marcia Stribling, Law Related Education
Coordinator, at the State Bar of Nevada in Las Vegas.
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regarding religion, the words "under God" in the Pledge have not and
likely will not endanger Establishment Clause principles. As a threshold
point, whatever laudable religious diversity and freedom may depict
American society hardly resolves the serious question whether and in
what numbers school children (or others) have felt coerced, even subtly,
either to embrace or to feign embracing the Pledge's official statement of
religious favoritism. That neither a national nor monolithic religion has
gripped America since 1954 is no proof that daily obligated recitation of
"under God" has no effect on impressionable children's perceptions
regarding religion.
Moreover, the purported lack of widespread negative effects is
completely irrelevant to the underlying philosophy - and singular
grandeur - of Constitutional rights. The Bill of Rights protects individuals.
A class of one no less than a class of many may demand full
constitutional coverage.7 Thus, societal approval cannot validate an
establishment of religion if one student feels compelled either to utter
"under God" or to stand in uncomfortable silence - if one parent feels
that State sponsored invocation of God interferes with her right to direct
the religious upbringing of her child,8 Contrary to the assertions of
Attorney Albright, to protect freedom for one and all, that is the way it
should be. .

3. Id., at 226.
4. Cf., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-93
(1954)(Invalidating officially mandated racial segregation of public
schools, the Court accented, "... we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896
when Plessy v. Ferguson [generally permitting "separate but equal" state
mandated racial segregation of public services] was written.")
5. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 78 (1985)(O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (legislative authorization of a one-minute period of silence
violated the Establishment Clause because the legislature's intent was
"wholly religious").
6. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)(emphasis
added).
7. Cf, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam)
(equal protection case).

ENDNOTES
1. E.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001);
Lamb's Chapel v. Central Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384 (1993).
2. E.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26
(1963).
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